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1. Introduction: a theoretical comparison of ideal-typical 
models of the European multi-level constitution 
The current discussion on fundamental social rights within the context 
of European constitutional reform is stimulating and rich. Fundamental social 
rights have been at the centre of a rich and imaginative academic and 
political debate since the end of the 1980s and particularly during the 1990s 
(see amongst others Däubler 1991; Lord Wedderburn 1995; A. Lyon-Caen 
and Simitis 1993; Rodríguez-Piñero, Casas 1996). Labour and social security 
lawyers have intensively participated and contributed to this debate, 
invoking and stimulating constitutional reform at European level (see 
especially Bercusson et al. 1996; Blanpain, Hepple, Sciarra, Weiss 1996, and 
the so called Simitis Report: Commission EC 1999). 
More recently, the focus of attention on social rights in the European 
constitution has been on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (EU) and its prospects for incorporation in Part II of the draft Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe (see Kenner 2003b; Sciarra 2004). 
Much of the most recent debate on the constitutionalisation of fundamental 
social rights at the highest normative level of the European legal order has 
been about the legal relevance and normative weight of EU social rights vis à 
vis  the fundamental market freedoms traditionally guaranteed by the 
Community economic constitution (Poiares Maduro 1998; Baquero Cruz 
2002; Sciarra 2003). The issue of re-balancing negative and positive 
integration (Scharpf 1999) by protecting fundamental social rights on par 
with economic freedom and free competition principles has re-gained 
momentum with the Nice Charter and with its insertion within the new 
European constitutional Treaty approved by the 2004 Intergovernmental 
Conference. 
In this context, the newly drafted Preamble of the Charter and Article 
II-112 of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe have, for 
instance, attracted criticism by labour lawyers inasmuch as they might 
weaken the level of constitutional protection of social rights. The newly 
inserted distinction between (true) rights and (mere) principles (Article II-
112.5) seems indeed to indicate a means of weakening certain rights - 
especially social rights - enshrined in the Nice Charter (see Bercusson 2003). 
Some worries appear again at the horizon as for the interpretation offered by SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  3 
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the Praesidium and now very oddly and unusually inserted in the Preamble 
of the Charter in Part II of the constitutional Treaty and in the newly drafted 
Article II-112.7. The risk is that such an improper distinction could threaten 
the central tenet of indivisibility of fundamental (civil, political, economic and 
social) rights firmly established in the Nice Charter. The auspices are that 
these amendments of the text of the Charter will not weaken the important 
interpretative potential of social rights and principles within the European 
Constitution (see Giubboni 2003b). 
In my contribution I shall leave these issues aside to focus on the more 
abstract and theoretical question regarding the place and legitimacy of social 
rights under the European multi-level constitution. The main focus  of this 
paper is the question of legitimacy  of constitutional protection of 
fundamental social rights within the Community legal order. The 
constitutional dimension of the relationship between social rights and the 
market in the context of Community integration will be accordingly 
considered from a theoretical point of view, leaving aside questions 
concerning the "effective" and "positive" dimension of social rights in the EU 
legal order as it actually stands. The main aim of this paper is to compare 
different ideal-typical models of the European multi-level constitution 
(Pernice 2002), comparing the different positions and roles social rights 
might take in the different ideal-typical constitutional stylised frameworks. 
The recognition and protection of fundamental social rights at the EU level 
opens up the question of legitimacy of European law, which varies greatly 
according to the different ideal-typical models of European constitution under 
consideration.  
The essential features of the different models will be illustrated, and 
their internal coherence examined, without, however, attempting to second 
guess future developments - whether likely or fanciful. The alternative 
models of federalism under consideration in this paper -  "competitive", 
"solidaristic” and "co-operative" - should be considered as heuristic tools for 
normative analysis, liberally drawn from the theoretical debate on the 
present and future of the economic constitution, and of the European polity 
more generally. Even the very terminology used for this purpose - as also 
applies to similar examples - is chosen simply for convenience and 
identification (see e. g. Barnard 2000; Petroni and Caporale 2000). In 
particular, the word "federalism" - of which the meaning is quite broad, even 
vague - is used in a deliberately non-technical sense (see Pernice 1996), 
leaving aside its more familiar usage within the debate on the possible 4  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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federal (or otherwise) future of the Euro-polity (for a recent re-appraisal of 
this debate see Kelemen 2004). Similarly, wherever the qualifying adjectives 
used coincide with those sometimes used to describe the form or historical 
development of particular federal States (such as the German or North 
American ones), they should not be interpreted as referring to any particular 
aspect of the debate surrounding these issues. 
2. The neo-liberal model of "competitive federalism" 
In the neo-liberal constitutional model of "competitive federalism", 
European law tends to be assigned the role of simply promoting the negative 
integration of national markets. Within this model, Community law has as its 
prime function the constitutional unification of the common market, 
conceived of as an economic space without internal borders. It achieves its 
task through the elimination of all normative barriers which interfere with 
the free circulation of factors of production (i.e., capital, labour, goods and 
services) and the free play of competitive forces. Following in the German 
tradition of Ordo-liberalism, which had a strong (but not exclusive) influence 
on the Community's conception of an economic constitution, supranational 
law, properly conceived of as "economic constitutional law", has the 
exclusive task of constructing and maintaining an open and competitive 
common market (for an account of Ordo-liberalism from the point of view of 
the European economic constitution see Joerges 1994; Everson 1999; for a 
theoretical re-construction see Gerber 1994; Miccù 1996; Cantaro 1999a). 
According to this conception, the open and free market has been put in 
place and enacted by Community law, and its efficient functioning is 
constitutionally guaranteed. The system finds expression both in the 
conferral of fundamental economic freedoms on market actors, and in the 
firm regulation of the competitive process. The latter regulation is 
simultaneously aimed at preventing the distorting interference of the state 
and the abuse of concentrating power in the form of private monopoly. 
One might emphasise the significant difference between the ordo-
liberal conception of the Freiburg school and the liberal constitutionalism of 
Hayek (see Irti 1998; Cassetti 2002): indeed the latter approach tends to 
conceive the market as a spontaneous order - which precedes (and is not 
constituted by) any decisions about the institutionalisation of the market 
order taken by the law of the economy - and therefore to consider economic 
rights as natural and pre-political liberties, which exist to a certain extent 
independently of their constitutional recognition. Thus the law, including the SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  5 
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Community legal order, is assigned a less significant role, or rather, a role 
which is not exactly at the foundation of the common market. This 
divergence in approaches has important repercussions for any attempt to 
characterise "economic constitutional law" as the basis for the legitimacy of 
Community law. From the ordo-liberal point of view, the market does not 
constitute a spontaneous order, which precedes public regulatory 
intervention, but rather represents an entity which is politically-instituted 
and socially-regulated through law. 
The characteristic element of this model is therefore a clear separation 
between the common market and the nation state, the constitutional 
construction of a transnational market taking place without the parallel 
development of coterminous mechanisms of control and imperative political 
correction of the market process. The result is the absence of a state-like 
(federal) body at the supranational level. This model is characterised, in 
other words, by the coexistence of a single European market and a multitude 
of rules of individual States applied to their own territories, without a level of 
political control equivalent to that in place for economic integration. 
Within this model, the governance mechanism par excellence is the 
market, and the main mechanism for bringing its virtues to bear is the 
generalised application of the principle of mutual recognition. This principle 
lies at the heart of "competitive federalism", in the sense that it ensures 
regulatory competition between the different national political-legal systems 
which together form this integrated economic space. The full mobility of the 
factors of production, and the circulation of the information necessary to 
make a comparison between different national political and institutional 
systems, allows economic actors  to make an informed and free choice 
between these different systems on the basis of their needs and rational 
preferences. The role of institutions and of the European constitutional law of 
the economy is precisely that of making regulatory competition possible, in 
the first instance by guaranteeing the freedom of movement of factors of 
production. 
The natural convergence of the preferences of rational actors 
(enterprises, workers and consumers) towards the most efficient and 
suitable system is the ideal mechanism for the production, according to 
supporters of this model, of a process of bottom-up harmonisation. This 
process is guided by the market and is intended to select and disseminate 
through by imitation the best regulatory model. The likely uniformisation 
which is set in motion by this bottom-up, ex post form of harmonisation is, 6  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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according to its advocates, different and better than that produced ex ante 
and top-down by heteronomous political intervention. The reason for the 
superiority of rules produced by this mechanism are twofold: not only is the 
ex post method an example of a "spontaneous" and "natural" process based 
on competition (and therefore, by definition, efficient), but also, its reliance 
on decentralised decisional mechanisms means that this method guarantees 
conformity with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Hayekian virtues of competition as a "process of discovery" (Hayek 
1998) are achieved in this way. The allocative efficiency function of the 
integrated market is maximised, and interventions by Member States, both 
corrective and (especially) re-distributive, are limited by the effects of fiscal 
competition. 
This model therefore prescribes the generalised application of the 
principle of mutual recognition. This implies its extension to the spheres of 
market regulation and labour relationships, the primary goal being to 
stimulate convergence on a model which is more flexible and favourable to 
employment growth. Thus regulatory competition on the European or 
international levels in the field of action of the welfare state serve to realise 
a process of discovery directed to identify which system of welfare - for 
whatever purpose - manages to demonstrate itself economically more 
efficient and sustainable in practice. 
Given that the supranational legal order places legal systems and 
national social policies in competition w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r ,  i t  d o e s  n o t  -  a n d  
cannot - deliberately set itself corrective or re-distributive tasks aimed at 
compensating for this decrease in the autonomy of Member States to 
intervene. The competitive federalism model considers Community law to be 
legitimate only in so far as it limits itself to ensuring the negative integration 
of national markets and to guaranteeing free competition in the common 
market. Its aim - and therefore the foundation of its legitimacy - consists 
simply in the creation and maintenance of an open and competitive 
European market. 
This limitation means that Community law - understood as the 
constitutional law of the European market (see Joerges 1994) - cannot 
legitimately turn its attention to the positive integration of national welfare 
systems. The foundations of the legitimacy of European law are essentially 
found in the guarantee of individual rights (civil and economic) against 
interference by national public authorities (Mestmäcker 1994). This 
normative and functional legitimacy is based on the recognition of the SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  7 
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fundamental freedoms of movement and the consequent guarantee of the 
effective functioning of the common market. The legitimacy of Community 
law rests on efficiency and freedom, assured by (and in) the European 
common market. For this reason, it does not require or presuppose the 
extension of the scope of supranational governance by analogy to the forms 
of representative or majoritarian democratic legitimacy. These forms have 
relevance only in the national political process. 
Social rights cannot be recognised at the European level, but should 
remain restricted to the level of competence of the Member States, together 
with political rights. The reason for this is that they go beyond what may 
legitimately be done by Community law: they are based on value choices 
which are only legitimate within national democratic political processes. 
Since the peoples of the EU do not see themselves as one people (as a 
demos), the supranational level of governance cannot be entrusted with re-
distributive functions. The EU legal order should be used to remove national 
barriers to access to free trade, without performing re-distributive functions. 
Social rights and re-distributive policies presuppose a sense of common 
belonging to a demos, which is totally lacking at the EU level. 
This model suggests that the Community/Union does not suffer from a 
democratic deficit only to the extent that it is based on a paradigm of the 
formal rationality of economic constitutional law. Community action also 
faces the problem of the lack of democratic legitimacy wherein the EU breaks 
out of the functional internal limits of the paradigm of formal law of the 
market in order to appropriate for itself the tasks that can be carried out 
democratically only by national welfare states. In particular, the tasks of 
reallocating social power in the area of labour relationships and/or of 
redistributing wealth, issues currently dealt with by national social rights, are 
examples of those functions for which the Community does not have the 
necessary resources of democratic legitimacy. 
3. The neo-socialdemocratic model of "solidaristic 
federalism" 
In the neo-liberal model of competitive federalism, the social 
sovereignty of the Member States, even if formally preserved, is reduced to 
an empty vessel, deprived of substance. This model suggests that the effects 
of negative integration, which stem jointly from the exercise of economic 
freedoms of movement and from regulatory competition between the 8  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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Member States, have the clear and calculated potential to dismantle national 
welfare systems. Indeed, it constitutes an explicit assumption of the neo-
liberal model that regulatory competition between national jurisdictions - 
supported by full mobility of the factors of production - produces a 
spontaneous convergence towards the system which is considered most 
efficient by the market.  
The progressive coalescence towards the "lightest" or "lowest" 
(national) social standard is seen as the natural and favoured outcome of the 
competitive process placed at the heart of this constitutional model. The 
truly liberal virtues of the model are visible in the restriction of public 
expenditure (including social spending) to a minimal level, which results 
from the "Leviathan-taming" effects, which are inherent in fiscal competition. 
The model of "solidaristic federalism" arises from preoccupation 
regarding the progressive decline in the social sovereignty of the Member 
States, which is one of the indispensable sources of their democratic 
legitimacy. This model advances a radically different alternative to the 
simple negative integration of markets. It asserts the need to rebuild at the 
supranational level those very capacities of political control of the economy 
which have been lost (or at least diminished) at the national level. 
This model emphasises the aim of the full positive integration of 
national welfare systems with the objectives of creating a European sphere 
of social protection policies, as well as "an Europe-wide sphere of 
entitlements to a decent livelihood" (Leibfried and Pierson 1994, p. 20) 
through the construction of an authentic political and democratic government 
of the common market. This institution would have substantial capacity to 
modify the distribution of life chances at the only level which now appears 
functionally adequate, that is, the supranational level. 
The European Union should - in this perspective - assume all the 
characteristics of a federal welfare state, equipped with a political 
constitution which is capable of bringing together the diverse traditions 
which already today come together to form the substantially unitary 
"European social model". The single market must be accompanied by 
corresponding full federalisation of the foundations of social citizenship. Their 
regeneration at the European level will put a halt to the erosion of the 
legitimacy of individual European welfare states. European law should be 
able to draw its own legitimacy from a political constitution, which expresses 
the democratic will of the peoples of Europe and gives form to their pact of 
solidarity. SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  9 
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According to this model, economic-functional and technocratic 
rationality, which the neo-liberal model uses to demonstrate the legitimacy 
of Community law, fails on two grounds. First, it does not succeed in 
explaining the full extent to which European integration has already taken 
place. Second, it is not able to justify the increasingly strong pressure which 
is being placed on national democratic political processes, especially 
concerning questions of social justice. It is based on a “normatively-reduced 
concept of the person” (Habermas 1999, p. 77), which only considers the 
instrumental rationality of the subject as an economic actor and is absolutely 
incapable of aspiring to the idea of equal respect for the human dignity of 
everyone, the notion which the recognition of fundamental social rights 
depends upon. 
According to the neo-socialdemocratic model of solidaristic federalism, 
therefore, re-imposing political control over the Community’s process of 
economic integration requires the creation of a European welfare state. This 
supranational state must be democratically legitimated in order to carry out 
those solidarity and social cohesion functions which today fall to the 
individual Member States. The transfer of this role may be justified by 
reference to the ever greater difficulty which the individual Member States 
have in effectively discharging their social functions. 
The achievement of European political union – necessary for the 
governance of a market which has reached full integration with the advent of 
the single currency – would find its most characteristic expression in the 
construction of a supranational welfare state structure, aimed at offering the 
citizens of Europe a high level of social protection. 
The solidaristic federalism model implies, according to neo-Keynesian 
logic, the restoration of a centralised management capable of regulating 
overall demand. To this end, the Union would need to be equipped with an 
adequate budget and its own fiscal resources to the degree necessary for its 
goals. 
Its most ambitious version calls for the development of a system of 
industrial relations and collective bargaining ("Euro-corporatism") on a pan-
European scale. This system would lead to the federalisation of the principal 
programmes of social protection (e. g., minimum wage, unemployment 
insurance and pension protection) and to the harmonisation of the highest 
standards which currently exist to govern the employment relationship. The 
European constitution – which would be hierarchically superimposed on 
those of the Member States – should contain an extended catalogue of social 10  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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rights which are fundamentally common (that is, uniformly applicable across 
the entire territory of the Union) and immediately justiciable. 
A Europe which might be considered the "Scandinavia of the world" 
could put itself forward as the only global subject which is really capable of 
taking part in the political governance of economic globalisation. It would 
then offer social security and social protection to all Europeans against the 
most destabilising effects of globalisation, taking as its reference point the 
historic gains made by the democratic welfare state. 
Europe needs to be aware of its possibilities, to regain its former 
solidaristic identity and to pursue its vocation of civilising the capitalist 
economy through social intervention. A rediscovery of its "social self" 
(Poiares Maduro 2000), taking full advantage of the potential set out in its 
"foundational moment" (ibid., p. 149), would assist the aim of creating a 
post-national democratic constitution based on the principles of liberty, 
substantial equality and solidarity. The constitutional moment of the EU 
draws its raison d’être from the exhaustion of the functionalist model and its 
incapacity to legitimate the actual political and institutional developments at 
the heart of the Community. 
Re-distributive and social cohesion functions have for some time been 
carried out to a significant degree at Community level. This demonstrates 
that the Community is already perfectly capable of bringing about that 
abstract solidarity "among strangers" (Habermas 1999, p. 151) which is the 
foundation of the democratic welfare state. 
The preconditions for the legitimate transfer of welfare functions from 
their present, predominantly national level to the European level already 
exists today. Those preconditions could be mutually reinforcing in a virtuous 
circle, nourished by the forces of legitimacy unleashed by the effective 
implementation of solidarity functions by EU institutions. 
The transformation of the EU’s political institutions into democratic and 
majoritarian forms of governance should rest on an underlying social 
contract, based on a criterion of distributive justice capable of guaranteeing 
full legitimacy to the decisions taken by the majority. The discursive 
elaboration of the contents of this new social contract, and of the link 
between civic solidarity and solidarity "between strangers", in which it has its 
roots, must be central to this building process. A building process which is 
undertaken in order to redefine the shape of the crucial question of the 
European social identity, of the European "social self" (Poiares Maduro 
2000). SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  11 
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4. The mixed model of "co-operative federalism"  
Critics of the solidaristic model of the Community’s economic 
constitution, and in particular of its assumptions of legitimacy, are not only 
found among those who argue this type of change is precluded by the lack of 
a European demos, and the substantial impossibility of one arising (at least 
in a time period shorter than a "geological era": Mancini 1999, p. 34). In 
fact, this objection is based on an assumption that does not pay adequate 
regard to the current normative and political reality of the European Union. 
In particular, it does not take account of the fact that the (conservative) 
notion of a sovereign people, forming an ethnically, linguistically, culturally 
and spiritually homogeneous entity, necessarily preceding the establishment 
of a democratic political state, is today in deep crisis. 
The model of solidaristic federalism also encounters objections from 
those who argue that a post-national democracy – embracing pluralistically 
the "multiple demoi" (Weiler 1996) of Europe – is not only possible (and 
desirable), but to a certain extent already visible within the constitutional 
developments of Community integration.  
It is argued that, since "even in a politically constituted European Union 
there will continue to exist an element of pragmatic agreement […] between 
the Member States, and the European federal state will have to assume a 
form which is different from national federal states of the classic kind and 
will not be able to simply imitate their methods of self-legitimation" 
(Habermas 1999, p. 121). While refuting the hypothesis which states that 
only a nation (understood as a "prepolitical community with a  common 
destiny") could develop that "anticipatory trust" (ibid., p. 84) and that 
feeling of solidarity which underlie the democratic re-distributive policies of 
the nation state, they argue that in fact it would be neither possible nor 
desirable to level the national identities of the Member States, merging them 
together in a single nation of Europe. 
The European Union would, in any event, have great difficulty 
reproducing the same forms of democratic majoritarian legitimacy, upon 
which to base re-distributive policies analogous to those of the nation state, 
and it should not try. 
Through this lens, the deep institutional diversity of national welfare 
states - rooted in their varying historical, political, economic and social 
contexts - lies at the root of two objections. There is an empirical and 
functional objection to the hypothesis that there should be unification of 12  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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these systems within a common supranational structure. There is also a truly 
normative objection, based on the attribution to the different national 
identities of a positive value, which should be preserved as such. Whatever 
difficulties it might face, any harmonisation project aimed at rendering 
national social policies and rights uniform, and in particular the construction 
of a truly "shared" European social law, would produce significant destructive 
or disintegrative effects within the different national welfare State 
constellations. These effects would be of no less impact than those which 
follow the process of negative integration. And it is difficult to imagine how 
such outcomes could ever be legitimated on the basis of democratically 
made majority decisions on a European scale. A complete federalisation of 
questions of distributive justice would clash with the need to preserve the 
diverse national democratic and social identities (see Ferrera 2004). 
The constitutional model of "co-operative federalism" aims to take 
account of the demand to respect these different identities, while at the 
same time preserving the social autonomy of the Member States in the face 
of the destructive effects arising from a competitive game which is politically 
unregulated at EU level. In this sense it proposes itself as a hybrid model or 
a solution which lies in between the two poles of "competitive federalism" 
and "solidaristic federalism". 
In the "co-operative federalism" model the functions of market 
correction and of redistribution of opportunities in life remain for the most 
part within the prerogative of the Member States of the Union. Labour and 
social security rights, as well as general welfare policies, will remain mainly 
nation-specific, relying on those resources of democratic material "input-
oriented" legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) which, in the absence of a fully 
developed European public sphere, only the nation-State can guarantee. 
The level of Community governance is essentially assigned a co-
ordinating role which consists in producing guidelines and undertaking 
monitoring functions. The aim of this is twofold. On the one hand, it aims at 
encouraging processes of mutual learning among the Member States, and, 
on the other, at stimulating attempts to find effective responses to common 
problems through the adoption of the best solution for the local situation. At 
the same time, this should prevent recourse to destructive forms of 
regulatory competition of the "beggar my neighbour" type. 
The European Union limits its direct regulatory activity to the social 
sphere, in each case giving preference to more flexible forms which are likely 
to have the effect of encouraging differentiation at the national and sub-SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  13 
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national level. Harmonisation aimed at uniformity or at approximation 
around a common model is replaced by "reflexive harmonisation" (Deakin 
1999; Barnard and Deakin 2003). This occurs through the elaboration of 
general principles, which are initially translated into the various systems by 
active support of the social partners for the self-regulatory process and 
through autonomous processes of adaptation at the national or sub-national 
level. This is an  intermediate form between pure centralisation and pure 
decentralisation, between heteronomous positive integration and anomic 
regulatory competition. 
In the model of co-operative federalism, the Community is built 
through the development of institutional mechanisms which allow the 
reconciliation of the defence of common European values and the 
heterogeneity of national models through which those values take form. In 
this way, the preservation of heterogeneity of the national systems allows 
forms of competition between those systems, while anchoring them to 
accepting common fundamental principles and - with the establishment of 
inderogable thresholds and non-regression clauses - pushes them to seek 
the "best rules". The differentiation, which may be marked, between 
standards of social protection among the various territorial communities, is 
not, however, left to the logic of the market, but is checked and guided by 
supranational governance. This defining of the rights and fundamental 
guarantees of the Community order in some sense defines even "the 
elements of justifiable diversity" between national legal orders (D'Antona 
1992). 
Along with the solidaristic federalism model, the co-operative 
federalism model also assigns a key role to the constitutionalisation of a 
strong catalogue of fundamental social rights directly at the level of the 
Union. There is also, however, an important difference between them. In the 
solidaristic model, the rights take the form of truly common  social rights, 
which means that they are designed to entrench the functions of 
redistribution and reallocation of social power directly at the level of the 
Union. By contrast, in the co-operative federalism model the European 
"social" constitution serves essentially as a guarantee and a measure of 
protection of social rights at the national level. It does not, in other words, 
aspire to substitute national forms of social protection, but rather to 
safeguard them, through exposing them, in a dialectical confrontation with 
the constitutional traditions of the other Member States, to a process of co-
operative elaboration of new meanings in the context of common 14  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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fundamental values. The constitutional recognition of European fundamental 
social rights will operate to preserve core common values in a dynamic and 
pluralist way without any pretence of achieving a uniform protective content, 
built either as a medium or average standard artificially extracted from the 
rules in force in the various countries. 
The relationship between Community sources and national sources of 
fundamental social rights is not structured in hierarchical terms, as in the 
case of solidaristic federalism, but rather is configured as a dynamic 
relationship of reciprocal subsidiarity, aimed at achieving the greatest 
achievement protection possible - in the prevailing conditions - of the social 
values which underlie the norm in question. The basic idea is that of a 
system in which many decisional levels coexist, which involves many 
institutional actors, each one bearing its own regulatory mission, and which 
are all linked with each other through a social model and common 
constitutional traditions. 
The predominant European governance mechanism is that of the 
network: the link between the different levels of government in the system is 
neither entrusted to the market - as in competitive federalism - nor to the 
hierarchical relationship between juridical rules and public bodies, as in the 
case of solidaristic federalism. Instead it is entrusted to open and diffuse 
mechanisms of decentralised and poli-centric co-ordination, and to the 
reciprocal and reflexive interdependence between the different levels of 
decision making and the different actors (public, quasi-public, social, private) 
who are involved. The elective regulatory technique is soft law open co-
ordination of national systems based on a floor of fundamental rights and 
principles, rather than mutual recognition (as in the competitive model) or 
hard law harmonisation (as in the solidaristic model) (see Della Cananea 
2003).  
Supranational intervention, while resting on a foundation of common 
values, is predominantly procedural, and relies on its deliberative character, 
as well as the open and participatory nature of its "polyarchic" (Choen and 
Sabel 1997) co-ordinating processes activated by it, for its legitimacy. The 
discussion of the conditions required for "deliberative supranationalism" 
constitutes a promising theoretical ground from which to gather the 
implications of the discursive and process-orientated legitimisation of the 
model (see Joerges 2002). The idea of the EU as a "deliberative polyarchy" 
(Cohen and Sabel 2003) adds insight towards a similar conceptualisation of 
the legitimacy foundations of this model. "In deliberative polyarchy, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  15 
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problem-solving depends not on harmony and spontaneous coordination, but 
on permanent disequilibrium of incentives and interests imperfectly aligned, 
and on the disciplined, collaborative exploration of the resulting differences" 
(ibid., p. 366). Thus, in this perspective, reflexive harmonisation and the 
open method of co-ordination are seen as "a highly promising mechanism for 
promoting crossnational deliberation and experimental learning across the 
European Union" (Zeitlin 2003, p. 5). 
5. Conclusions 
It was stated in the introduction that none of the models – stylised and 
ideal-typical – of Community economic constitution described above had the 
intention of hegemonically enshrining the actual course of European 
integration. These models, however, have influenced the theoretical debate 
in numerous ways and have even influenced the concrete modelling of the 
Community’s institutions. 
The echoes of the ordo-liberal concept are clearly discernable, for 
example, in the configuration of common competition law as the central 
propulsor of juridical unification within the unified market. The idea of Article 
28 of the Rome Treaty as a European "economic due process clause", which 
i s  e m b r a c e d  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o u r t s  o f  Justice at least until recently, is 
evidently very influenced by it (see Poiares Maduro 1998; Egan 2001). The 
"infiltration" (G. Lyon-Caen 1992) of European competition law and market 
law in national labour and social security laws draws strong arguments for its 
legitimacy from this very model. 
The model of solidalistic federalism has never been fully appreciated, 
probably not even during its peak years of "social democratic consensus". 
This did, however, create a vision of Europe that – no matter how politically 
minoritarian - maintains an undoubtfully attractive force, and it is certainly 
not absent from the debate on the constitutionalisation of fundamental social 
rights in the EU legal order (see for instance  the proposal for an "Euro-
stipendium by Schmitter and Bauer 2001). 
The model of co-operative federalism owes its ability to open the more 
significant perspectives of the prevailing tendencies – which are all but 
definite and linear – that appear today in paving the way to European 
integration to its position as a middle-ground. Its medietas, however, also 
makes it the least defined model, as well as full of incognitos, especially 
when it overlaps the concrete dynamics of Community integration. 16  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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It has been suggested that the decentralised and not hierarchical 
mechanisms of open co-ordination, grounded as they are on the defense of 
specific national identities, do not have the intention of preserving the 
particularities of each welfare system, but rather the very opposite intention 
of the Member States of using their own sovreignity in social issues as an 
alternative mechanism for adjusting their own competitiveness 
compensating for the loss of sovreignty on currency and exchange rates 
(Cantaro 1999b). 
The eminently procedural orientation of the model risks creating no 
more than merely symbolic limits to the weight of the self-regulating 
mechanisms of the integrated market (see Deakin and Reed 2000). While 
t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  m a r k e t  i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  a b l e  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  m o s t  p o w e r f u l  
effects of complete monetary unification, the mechanisms of deliberative 
governance have not yet reached full maturity and risk being used simply for 
responding to – re-legitmizing ex post – decisions actually made by the 
market. 
The risks involved in de-structuring national traditions of fundamental 
social rights in an approach that should orient itself accentuatedly in a post-
regulatory and merely procedural direction, can only be compensated for 
through the decisive re-affirmation of the cogent force of the founding and 
common values of the European social model at Community constitutional 
level. Such an approach, which is solely procedural, is insuffucient: the 
States, as well as the European Union when involved, cannot limit 
themselves to organising rules of procedure that allow the participation of 
individuals and intermediary groups in the definition and realisation of the 
interests normally under their responsibility. They also have to lay down the 
principles that are the very basis of this definition, so as to guarantee 
individuals and groups their fundamental social rights (see Supiot 2001). 
The full affirmation of fundamental social rights within the Community 
legal order represents an essential step in this critical phase of European 
integration. The constitutionalisation of these rights at the heart of the EU 
legal order also constitutes – as previously mentionned – a supporting axis 
of the co-operative federalism model. In the absence of a substantial 
common foundation of values guaranteed by the affirmation of principles and 
Community fundamental social rights, it is difficult to imagine that the 
pluralsim of national welfare state traditions can be preserved and adapted 
to the new socio-economic needs without simply giving into the levelling 
pressure of market integration. SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION:  17 
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The drive towards Community constitutionalisation of fundamental 
social rights does not derive only from the need to protect essential 
principles of social justice and solidarity from (and against the) logic of the 
market. It derives from considerations of economic efficiency. Fundamental 
social rights are actually a determining component for the dynamic efficiency 
and the long-term competitivity of open and complex market economies: far 
from being adverse to market relations, they should be considered central to 
a European labour market which is becoming ever-more flexible and 
individualised  (see Deakin and Wilkinson 1994). 
The awareness of this essential economic function of social rights was 
no stranger to the compromise of post-war embedded liberalism, whose 
founding fathers inspired the construction of the Community (Giubboni 
2003a, especially Chapter 1). Today, more than ever, it should guide the 
indispensable re-definition of the contours of the European social model. 
The values of freedom and solidarity embodied to differing degrees by 
the national traditions of labour and social security law constitute a 
fundamental patrimony of the European democracies. Re-declined and 
dutifully up-dated, these must remain central to the construction of the 
Community (see Kenner 2003a; Giubboni 2003c). Strengthening the 
constitutional roots of European social rights and strengthening the 
institutional capabilities of the social parties – which have always been the 
main actors in the dynamics of labour law and its extraordinary adaptability 
to the changing needs of the market – make up, today more than ever, the 
crucial groundwork for democratic legitimacy of any advancement in the 
process of European integration. 
The draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe might realise a 
significant re-definition of the fundamental values and objectives inspiring 
the EU mission in the globalised world. The insertion of the European Charter 
of fundamental rights in Part II of the constitutional Treaty might imply a full 
constitutionalisation of social rights within the EU legal order on par with 
economic freedoms, according to the principle of indivisibility of fundamental 
values and rights. The draft constitutional Treaty, notwithstanding its limits 
and shortcomings, represents therefore a fundamental step in the process of 
building solid constitutional roots for the European social model (Giubboni 
2004). Its ratification by the Member States would be a decisive move in 
pursuing what Joseph Weiler has called the "European Sonderweg" (Weiler 
2000). 18  STEFANO GIUBBONI  
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